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THE F-WORD: A JURISPRUDENTIAL




The controversial comedian, George Carlin, provides an
apt introduction to the F-word subject in a segment of his
1970 album, Occupation Foole. In Federal Communications
Commission v. Pacifica Foundation,' Carlin's creative per-
formance in Occupation Foole was indirectly attacked in a ra-
dio station licensing dispute. In his album, Carlin opined:
I was thinking about the curse words and the swear
words, the cuss words and the words that you can't say,
that you're not supposed to say all the time .... The
original seven words were shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cock-
sucker, motherfucker, and tits. Those are the ones that
will curve your spine, grow hair on your hands and maybe,
even bring us, God help us, peace without honor .... And
now the first thing that we noticed was that word fuck
was really repeated in there because the word mother-
fucker is a compound word and it's another form of the
word fuck. [If y]ou want to be a purist it doesn't really-it
can't be on the list of basic words .... Then you have the
four letter words from the old Anglo-Saxon theme. Uh,
shit and fuck....
... The big one, the word fuck that's the one that hangs
them up the most. 'Cause in a lot of cases that's the very
act that hangs them up the most. So, it's natural that the
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. J.D., Cornell
Law School; B.S., University of Pennsylvania (Wharton School).
1. Federal Communications Comm'n. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978).
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word would, uh, have the same effect. It's a great word,
fuck, nice word, easy word, cute word, kind of. Easy word
to say. One syllable, short u. Fuck. You know, it's easy.
Starts with a nice soft sound fuh ends with a kuh. Right?
A little something for everyone. Fuck. Good word. Kind
of a proud word, too. Who are you? I am FUCK, FUCK
OF THE MOUNTAIN. Tune in again next week to FUCK
OF THE MOUNTAIN. It's an interesting word too, 'cause
it's got a double kind of life-personality-dual, you know,
whatever the right phrase is. It leads a double life, the
word fuck. First of all, it means, sometimes, most of the
time, fuck. What does it mean? It means to make love.
Right? We're going to make love, yeah, we're going to
fuck.... Right? And it also means the beginning of life,
it's the act that begins life, so there's the word hanging
around with words like love, and life, and yet on the other
hand, it's also a word that we really use to hurt each other
with, man. It's a heavy. It's one that you have toward the
end of the argument. Right? You finally can't make out.
Oh, fuck you, man. I said, fuck you. Stupid fuck. Fuck
you and everybody that looks like you, man. It would be
nice to change the movies that we already have and sub-
stitute the word fuck for the word kill, wherever we could,
and some of these movie clich6s would change a little bit.
Madfuckers still on the loose. Stop me before I fuck again.
Fuck the ump, fuck the ump, fuck the ump, fuck the ump,
fuck the ump. Easy on the clutch Bill, you'll fuck that en-
gine again.
Indeed, the F-word, in all its stunning variations and
word combinations,' is a form of "American slang"-the body
of words and expressions frequently used by or intelligible to
most of the general American public but not accepted as
proper usage by the majority.4 As one commentator has
pointed out, Americans love to use slang:
Americans ... use.., slang more than any other people.
American slang reflects the kind of people who create
2. Id. at 751-54 (emphasis added).
3. See infra Part II.
4. Stuart Berg Flexner, Preface to NEW DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN SLANG
at xvii (Robert L. Chapman ed., 1986) ("No word can be called slang simply be-
cause of its etymological history; its source, its spelling, and its meaning in a
larger sense do not make it slang. Slang is best defined by a dictionary that
points out who uses slang and what 'flavor' it conveys.").
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and use it. Its diversity and popularity are in part due to
the imagination, self-confidence, and optimism of our peo-
ple. Its vitality is in further part due to our guarantee of
free speech and to our lack of a national academy of lan-
guage or any "official" attempt to purify our speech.5
Slang allows us to communicate with each other "more
quickly and easily, and more personally, than does a standard
word."' Moreover, "[s]ometimes we resort to slang because
there is no one standard word to use."' In addition, "[w]e also
use slang because it often is more forceful, vivid, and expres-
sive than are standard usages. Slang usually avoids the sen-
timentality and formality that older words often assume."8
Furthermore, slang can be used in those situations where we
do not want to commit ourselves too strongly to what we are
saying.9
In an interesting way, slang implicates gender issues.
While there are, no doubt, a number of foul-mouthed females
in America, males-particularly young males-are fond of
slang for its shock value where "[t]he rapid tempo of life,
combined with a sometimes low boiling point of males, can
evoke emotions-admiration, joy, contempt, anger-stronger
than our old standard vocabulary can convey." ° For example,
"[i]n the stress of the moment a man is not just in a standard
'untenable position,' he is up the creek. Under strong anger a
man does not feel that another is a mere 'incompetent'-he is
a jerk or a fuck-off.""
5. Id. at xx. Furthermore,
Americans are restless and frequently move from region to region and
from job to job. This hopeful wanderlust, from the time of the pioneers
through our westward expansion to modern mobility, has helped to
spread regional and group terms until they have become general slang.
Such restlessness has created constantly new situations which provoke
new words.
Id.
6. Id. at xxii.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See id. at xxiii.
10. Flexner, supra note 4, at xxv.
11. Id. (emphasis in original). It is important, however, to understand that
["slang"] actually does not exist as an entity except in the minds of
those of us who study the language. People express themselves and are
seldom aware that they are using the artificial divisions of "slang" or
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This article focuses on the following inquiry: what are the
types of cases where American courts have had the occasion
to adjudicate disputes involving the F-word, or its variations,
and how have they resolved those disputes? I call this in-
quiry a "jurisprudential taxonomy of American morals" be-
cause in the process of labeling, reporting, or legally charac-
terizing the use of the F-word in their opinions, judges have
explicitly or implicitly made some interesting moral assess-
ments of the use of language in particular circumstances.12
Part II, as a foundation for this inquiry, covers the defini-
tions, etymological origins, and modern-day multiplicity of
American meanings of the F-word and its permutations.
Part III examines and categorizes a number of American
cases that have mentioned the F-word or one of its varia-
tions.' 4 In this regard, the article focuses on the judges' reac-
tions to use of the F-word (e.g., good/bad, harmful/harmless,
protected/unprotected) and the legal consequences realized by
the speaker or writer who utilized the F-word. Finally, Part
IV includes a short and tentative synthesis and critique of
F-word jurisprudence. 5
II. THE COMPLEX ETYMOLOGY AND LEXICOLOGY OF THE
F-WORD: A MULTIPLICITY OF MEANINGS
A. Early History
"Fuck" is a word "related to words in several . . .Ger-
manic languages, such as Dutch, German, and Swedish, that
12. In a fascinating, non-judicial (at least at this point in time), moral de-
bate on use of another extremely controversial and socially taboo slang word-
the "N-word"-the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) threatened to boycott Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary be-
cause of the Dictionary's continued use of the N-word to describe a "black per-
son," without indicating that the word is a "racial slur." See Eric Felten, Im-
proper Nouns, THE WKLY. STANDARD, June 1, 1998, at 18. As a result of the
threatened boycott, according to Felten, "Merriam Webster convened a multicul-
tural group of in-house experts and outside consultants to determine whether,
and how, to change the way it describes a wide range of opprobrious slang and
other vulgarities." Id.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III. For the remainder of this article, whenever I mention
the "F-word" I mean to include the original Anglo-Saxon, four-letter word,
"fuck," and all potential embellishments and variations discussed infra in Part
II.
15. See infra Part IV.
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have sexual meanings as well as meanings like 'to strike' or
'to thrust."..6  Amazingly, "[d]espite the importance of the
F-word, scholars have yet to discover an example of fuck (or
any of its Germanic relatives) before the fifteenth century."7
Why the relatively recent evidence of usage of the
F-word? One author has cogently reasoned that the simplest
and most probable explanation is "that the word carried a ta-
boo so strong that it was never written down in the Middle
Ages." 8 Moreover, "[t]he fact that its earliest known appear-
ance in English, around 1475, is in a cipher lends surprising,
though limited, support to this interpretation."'9 A related
reason for the F-word's relatively recent usage is the abun-
dant record of legal "restrictions on certain forms of speech
from the earliest times in England."2" By way of illustration,
"one seventeenth century law from Kent reads: 'If anyone in
another's house . . . shamefully accosts him with insulting
words, he is to pay a shilling to him who owns the house."''
16. THE F-WORD at xxiv (Jesse Sheidlower ed., 1995).
17. Id. at xxiv-xxv (emphasis in original).
18. Id. at xxv. According to one author, a "taboo" is:
a ban or prohibition; the word comes from the Polynesian languages
where it means a religious restriction, to break which would entail
some automatic punishment. As it is used in English, taboo has little
to do with religion. In essence it generally implies a rule which has no
meaning, or one which cannot be explained. Captain Cook noted in his
log-book that in Tahiti the women were never allowed to eat with the
men, and as the men nevertheless enjoyed female company he asked
the reason for this taboo. They always replied that they observed it be-
cause it was right. To the outsider the taboo is irrational, to the be-
liever its righteousness needs no explaining. Though supernatural
punishments may not be expected to follow, the rules of any religion
rate as taboos to outsiders. For example, the strict Jewish observance
forbids the faithful to make and refuel the fire, or light lamps or put
them out during the Sabbath, and it also forbids them to ask a Gentile
to perform any of these acts.
Mary Douglas, Taboo, in 10 MAN, MYTH & MAGIc 2767 (Richard Cavendish, et
al. eds., 1983).
19. SHEIDLOWER, supra note 16, at xxv.
20. Id.
21. Id.
Since many of the earliest examples [of the use of the F-word] come
from Scottish sources, some scholars have suggested that it is a Norse
borrowing. Norse [had] a much greater influence on the northern and
Scottish varieties of English than on southern dialects. But the re-
cently discovered 1528 example-found in that common source of
bawdy jokes, a marginal note to a manuscript-and the ciphered ex-
ample[s] are both from England and prove that fuck was not restricted
to Scotland in its earliest days. The explanation for the profusion of
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B. Modern History
During the early seventeenth century, Shakespeare pep-
pered several of his plays with vulgarities.22 While it appears
that he never actually used the word "fuck" itself, there are
"several examples in [his work] of probable puns or references
to the word."" Apparently, the word was included as a main
entry in a dictionary for the first time in 1671.4 The euphe-
mism "F-word" was not used until the early twentieth cen-
tury.
2 5
C. "Fuck" as a Noun
The word "fuck" is used as a noun in several contexts:
first, as "an act of copulation";2 6 second, as "copulation itself';
7
third, "a person considered as a sexual partner";28 fourth, "a
jot" (as in "not care a fuck"); 9 fifth, "anything whatsoever " "-
used in the negative (as in "he didn't know fuck"); sixth, "used
with like, as or than as an emphatic standard of comparison""'
(as in "it's raining like a fuck outside"); seventh, "a bit of dif-
ference"-used in the negative (as in "it don't make a fuck
who it is"); 2 eighth, "semen"; 3 ninth, "a despicable person,
usually a man";4 and tenth, "an evil turn of events; a cheat of
fortune" (as in "I graduated with honors and he flunked out-
ain't that a fuck").35
The noun form of "fuck" has been used by Americans in a
variety of noun-phrases. Chief examples of these noun-
phrases include: "flying fuck,"" "for fuck's sake,"
37 
"fuck of,"38
Scottish examples might simply be that the taboo against the word was
less strong in Scotland.
Id.
22. Id. at xxvi.
23. Id.
24. Id. at xxvii.
25. See SHEIDLOWER, supra note 16, at xxix.
26. Id. at 90.
27. Id. at 91.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 92.
30. Id. at 94.
31. SHEIDLOWER, supra note 16, at 94.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 95.
35. Id. at 96.
36. Id. at 96. "Flying fuck" means "[a] damn; the least bit-usually used in
the negative, with give. Also in euphemistic variants" (e.g., "I don't give a flying
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"the fuck,"" "the fuck of it,"4 and "holy fuck!"4
D. "Fuck" as a Verb
The word "fuck" is used as a verb in numerous situations:
first, "to copulate or copulate with";42 second, "to harm irrepa-
rably; finish; victimize" (as in "Vietnam fucked you");43 third,
"to botch; bungle" (as in "you fucked it again");" fourth, "to
cheat; victimize; deceive; betray" (as in "you know you're go-
ing to be fucked, you just don't know when");45 fifth, "to exploit
to one's own benefit" (as in "I'm going to stay here, but I'm
going to fuck the job to death");"' sixth, "to cease or abandon,
especially suddenly; ditch" (as in "I got the idea to fuck every-
thing and head for California");47 and seventh, "to trifle, toy,
meddle, or interfere; fool; play; to harass, tease, or provoke;
mess-used with... with" (as in "Tony tells me you're good at
law. I used to fuck with it"). 48
The verb form of "fuck" has been used by Americans in a
variety of verb-phrases. Prominent exemplars of these verb-
phrases include: "fuck a duck,"49 "fucked [up] and far from
home,"50 "fucked by the fickle finger of fate,"5 "fuck (some-
fuck what you do"). Id. at 65-66. Another variation of this phrase is "[go] take a
flying fuck," meaning "Get away! Go to hell!" (e.g., "why don't you go take a
flying fuck at a rolling doughnut?"). Id. at 66-67.
37. See SHEIDLOWER, supra note 16, at 96. "For fuck's sake" means "for
heaven's sake" (e.g., "Now he is on tour for fuck's sake"). Id.
38. Id. at 96. "Fuck of" means "a notable example or quantity of; hell of"
(e.g., "It would be a fuck of a lot more interesting"). Id.
39. Id. This phrase is "used as an expletive" (e.g., "Where the fuck are
we?"). Id. at 98.
40. Id. at 99. "The fuck of it" means "the fun of it; the hell of it." (e.g., "I
went down there just for the fuck of it."). Id.
41. Id. at 97. This phrase is "used to express astonishment" (e.g., "Holy
fuck! We're going to freeze our asses offi").
42. Id. at 100.
43. SHEIDLOWER, supra note 16, at 106-07.
44. Id. at 107.
45. Id. at 108-09.
46. Id. at 110.
47. Id. at 113.
48. Id. at 113-14.
49. SHEIDLOWER, supra note 16, at 115. "Fuck a duck" has a variety of
meanings including "Get out! Go to hell!" (e.g., "Go fuck a duck") and "to engage
in indiscriminate sexual promiscuity." Id.
50. Id. at 116. "Fucked [up] and far from home" means "in a hopeless situa-
tion" (e.g., "When the IRS was through auditing my return, I was fucked and far
from home").
51. Id. "Fucked by the fickle finger of fate" means "thwarted or victimized
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one's) mind,"52 "go fuck [yourself],"53 and "get fucked!"' 4
E. F-word Adjectives
When combined with certain other words, the F-word can
be employed as an adjective. By way of illustration, the
phrase "fucked up" is used as an adjective that can have a va-
riety of possible meanings including (1) "ruined or spoiled, es-
pecially through incompetence or stupidity; chaotic" (as in "I
never heard of such a fucked-up mess");55 (2) "heavily intoxi-
cated by liquor or drugs" (as in "We'll smoke up some weed,
get all fucked up, feel no fuckin' pain");56 (3) "thoroughly con-
fused; mentally or emotionally ill; crazy" (as in "He wasn't a
bad kid, just fucked-up"); 7 (4) "deeply troubled or upset; dis-
traught" (as in, "I was all fucked up when I wrote it and
threw away about 100,000 words which was better than most
of what I left in"); 8 (5) "contemptible; worthless; miserable"
(as in "I've met a lot of politicians, and politicians are fucked
up everywhere.... ).59 The creative compound word "fuck-
faced" is also used as an adjective meaning "having an ugly or
miserable face; despicable" (as in "gradually people filed down
for breakfast. Totally bleary-eyed and fuck-faced").60
F. F-word Adverbs
In various verbal formulations, an F-word can be utilized
as an adverb. For example, the word "fucking" as an adverb
means "exceedingly; damned" (as in "You're very fucking
by bad fortune" (e.g., "I was being totally and fatally fucked by the fickle finger
of fate"). Id. at 116-17.
52. Id. at 119. "Fuck (someone's) mind" means "to astonish, intimidate, or
befuddle" (e.g., "[Solitary confinement] fucks your mind").
53. Id. "Go fuck [yourself]" means "Go to hell! Get out! Be damned!" (e.g.,
"Joe got sore and told him to go fuck himself"). Id.
54. Id. at 120. "Get fucked!" means "Go to hell!" (e.g., "Tell that dipshit to
get fucked!").
55. SHEIDLOWER, supra note 16, at 134.
56. Id. at 135.
57. Id. at 135-36.
58. Id. at 137.
59. Id. at 137-38.
60. Id. at 142. Some other adjective variations of the F-word are "FUBAR"
(e.g., "It's FUBAR-fucked up beyond all recognition"), id. at 88, and "fucked
over" (e.g., "I was fucked over last night"), id. at 133-34.
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rude .... ").6  Other examples are the adverbs "fuckingly,"
meaning "extremely; damned" (as in "[M]y life has been so
fuckingly complicated.. .")62-which is very close in meaning
to "fucking" and "abso-fucking-lutely," meaning "absolutely"
(as in "t]hat's abso-fucking-lutely right").63
G. Endless Variations
It seems that Americans coin endless variations of the
F-word. From a linguistic standpoint, this elasticity of word
format and accompanying meanings is what makes study of
the use of the F-word such a fascinating subject. Without at-
tempting to provide definitions or examples of word usage,
the following is a random list of F-word variations not previ-
ously discussed in this article: "AMF: Adios Motherfucker,"64
"BFD: Big Fucking Deal,"" "Bumfuck, Egypt,"" "Dumbfuck,"
67
"Fanfuckingtastic,"68  "Fiddlefuck,"'  "Fuck-off,"76  "Give-a-
fuck,"71  "Guaran-fucking-tee," 72  and "SNAFU" (meaning
"Situation Normal: All Fucked Up"). 73
III. F-CASES AND F-CLASSIFICATIONS
A. Cop Cases
A number of reported cases discuss the use of the F-word
by civilians against police officers or other civilians.4  In the
majority of these cases, the courts have generally detected a
tension between the potential disruption of the law enforce-
ment function and order of the community occasioned by
61. SHEIDLOWER, supra note 16, at 146-47.
62. Id. at 151.
63. Id. at 39. Some other adverb permutations of the F-word are "fucking
well" (e.g., "He better fucking well run into me"), id. at 152; "motherfucking"
(an adjective) (e.g., "He's a motherfucking liar"), id. at 206; and ASAFP (e.g.,
"ASAFP - as soon as fucking possible"), id. at 39.
64. Id. at 39.
65. Id. at 41.
66. Id. at 46.
67. SHEIDLOWER, supra note 16, at 56.
68. Id. at 58.
69. Id. at 60.
70. Id. at 154.
71. Id. at 176.
72. Id. at 178.
73. SHEIDLOWER, supra note 16, at 220.
74. See, e.g., infra Part III.A.
1999]
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F-word epithets, on the one hand, and the presumed ability of
police officers to manage potentially violent disputes without
unnecessary force, on the other hand.
A good illustration of this type of analysis is an Alabama
case, B.E.S. v. State,75 which discussed the fairly frequently
encountered scenario of a civilian hurling F-word insults at
the police. The defendant in B.E.S. was a juvenile at the time
of the F-word usage. The B.E.S. court, referring to two previ-
ous F-word cases it had decided, noted:
Unfortunately, epithets... directed at a police officer in
the performance of his duties are not uncommon in today's
law enforcement environment. The fact that an officer en-
counters such vulgarities with some frequency, and the
fact that his training enables him to diffuse a potentially
volatile situation without physical retaliation, however,
means that words which might provoke a violent response
from the average person do not, when addressed to a po-
lice officer, amount to fighting words."'
The Alabama court's more extended discourse in B.E.S.
regarding hypothetical civilian use of the F-word-as well as
other potentially insulting slang-is interesting for three rea-
sons. First, relying upon the seminal 1942 Supreme Court
opinion in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,7 7 the Alabama
judges in B.E.S. identified "fighting words" (also referred to
as "insulting" words) as among "certain well-defined and nar-
rowly limited classes of speech"-like "the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous"-which do not have any constitu-
tional freedom of speech protection under the First Amend-
ment.78 Thus, B.E.S. implied that "fuck" is a fighting word
and therefore unprotected. Second, the Alabama court rea-
soned that a police officer, by virtue of his or her extensive
training in peaceful dispute resolution techniques, would
rarely-if ever-be justified in being provoked to physically
retaliate against a civilian, who, without accompanying
physical violence or threats, merely used the F-word against
75. B.E.S. v. State, 629 So. 2d 761 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
76. Id. at 764. (quoting Shinault v. City of Huntsville, 579 So. 2d 696, 700
(Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (Bowen, J., concurring) (citing Robinson v. State, 615 So.
2d 112, 114 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992))) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
B.E.S. case itself, however, involved a juvenile who directed the F-word at ci-
vilians, and was subject to delinquency proceedings.
77. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
78. B.E.S., 629 So. 2d at 763 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72).
[Vol. 40
THE F- WORD
the officer.79 The court implied that extremely personal use of
the F-word, aimed at a specific police officer, might conceiva-
bly be unprotected by the First Amendment and therefore,
justify legal punishment. ° Third, the Alabama court, recog-
nizing the realities of human nature, noted that "[w]ithout of-
fering any approval of such use, . . . that the word 'fuck' is
used habitually.., by any number of people" for the purpose
of "add[ing] emphasis, much in the manner as 'hell' or 'damn'
might be used."81
In Robinson v. State,"2 an Indiana Court of Appeals two-
judge panel majority upheld the conviction of the defendant
for disorderly conduct under a state statute. The defendant's
disorderly conduct included screaming F-word epithets at the
investigating police officer, telling the officer to "to get the
fuck away" and that the officer was a "lying motherfucker." 3
Regarding the issue of whether or not Robinson's words were
constitutionally unprotected "fighting words," Judge Shields,
the dissenting judge, acknowledged that "at some earlier
point in [American history]," the F-word "undoubtedly had a
meaning which would fall within the scope of 'fighting
words'... [but] in present common usage [the F-word is de-
ployed to refer to] 'a mean, despicable, or vicious person,' and
'anything considered to be despicable [or] frustrating"' and,
therefore, does not constitute fighting words.' Thus, accord-
ing to the Shields' dissent, "[s]o defined, the [F-word] terms
are no more injurious than the terms 'asshole,' defined as 'a
stupid mean, [sic] or contemptible person,"' the latter which
was judicially found not to constitute fighting words.85
79. See id. at 764.
80. See id. See also Robinson v. State, 588 N.E.2d 533, 535-36 (Ind. Ct. App.
1992) (arrested civilian screamed that officer was a "lying motherfucker"). The
B.E.S. court also distinguished the typical situation of F-word usage by civilians
against police by citing L.J.M. v. State, 541 So. 2d 1321, 1322-23 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1989) (calling police officer "pussy-assed motherfucker").
81. B.E.S., 629 So. 2d at 765 (citing Diehl v. State, 451 A.2d 115, 122 (Md.
1982) (noting that, with regard to the F-word, "[o]ne man's vulgarity may well
be another's vernacular"). See also State v. Human Rights Comm'n, 534 N.E.2d
161, 169 (Ill. App. 1989) (upholding magistrate's finding that use of "general
sexual terms" such as "fuck" and "motherfucker" as expletives "did not amount
to sexual conduct" in sexual harassment case).
82. Robinson, 588 N.E.2d at 533.
83. Id. at 535-36.
84. Id. at 536 (Shields, J., dissenting).
85. Id. See also Cavazos v. State, 455 N.E.2d 618, 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
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C.J.R. v. State,6 a Florida court decision, also involved
use of the F-word to a police officer. However, the legal issue
was different from the legal issues addressed in B.E.S. and
Robinson.87 In C.J.R., the dispute involved the juvenile delin-
quency of a minor. The juvenile in C.J.R. appealed from a
trial court order, which had found him to be a delinquent for
both carrying a concealed weapon (num-chucks) and cursing
at the arresting officer, thereby impeding the officer from
conducting a breathalyzer test to determine whether the ju-
venile was intoxicated.88 The facts indicated that the juvenile
cursed in "an extremely loud voice," used phrases such as
"fuck this shit" and "motherfucker," and indicated that he had
no intention of cooperating with the officer.89 While the ma-
jority determined that the juvenile's various uses of the
F-word were unprotected speech-being "fighting words"-
Judge Ervin dissented from that portion of the appellate deci-
sion that labeled the F-word usage constitutionally unpro-
tected speech. ° According to the dissent, "[t]he [juvenile's]
verbal indiscretions were unaccompanied by any threat to the
personal safety of the officers. After they were made, the ju-
venile turned away for the purpose of calling his mother, and
at that point he was seized from behind, arrested and hand-
cuffed."9' Judge Ervin contrasted C.J.R. with a similar Flor-
ida Supreme Court case, D.C.E. v. State," in which the juve-
niles also used the F-word at a police officer with no threat of
physical violence. However, in D.C.E., the Florida Supreme
Court found no disorderly conduct occurred by the youths
shouting the F-word, while in C.J.R. the majority held the ju-
venile a delinquent for speaking the F-word.93 Therefore,
given the Florida Supreme Court precedent, Judge Ervin's
analysis is correct.
Village of North Randall v. Bacon,94 an Ohio decision,
presents an interesting twist on the typical cop case scenario.
86. C.J.R. v. State, 429 So. 2d 753 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
87. See supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
88. See C.J.R., 429 So. 2d at 753.
89. C.J.R., 429 So. 2d at 754.
90. See id. at 754-55 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 755.
92. D.C.E. v. State, 381 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1979).
93. C.J.R., 429 So. 2d at 755 (citing D.C.E., 381 So. 2d 1097).
94. Village of N. Randall v. Bacon, No. 42686, 1981 WL 5013 (Ohio Ct. App.
1981) (ordered unpublished by OHIO SUP. CT. R. 2).
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Bacon involved a store customer utilizing the F-word in an
extremely aggressive context ("go fuck yourself' and "I'll
break your fucking neck") to a private store security guard.
The court held that the store customer had violated a town
ordinance prohibiting fighting words.95 While the court gives
no explanation, it is probable that the fact that the guard was
a private, rather than public, employee was an important fac-
tor in this decision.
Larez v. City of Los Angeles96 involved another interesting
twist to the typical cop case scenario. In Larez, Los Angeles
citizens brought a federal civil rights action against Los An-
geles police officers for excessive force and violation of the
citizens' civil rights. The police were found liable for com-
pensatory and punitive damages for misuse of their legal
authority to investigate crimes and arrest perpetrators.98 The
significant evidence, which supported the plaintiffs, included
the use of the F-word in a number of contexts. For instance,
the F-word was used by police officers during searches of
premises ("[we have] every damn fucking right to be on [the]
property").99 Another incident involved a police officer point-
ing a revolver at a victim's head while using the F-word ("I
could blow your fucking head off right here and nobody can
prove you did not try to do something"). 0 Yet another occur-
rence involved an arrest while members of the police used
various F-words ("Get up here with that fucking baby"; "Put
[your] fucking face on the floor"; and "I'll blow your fucking
head off').' ° ' Use of the F-word by police officers was appar-
ently viewed by the Larez court as a violation of what citizens
have a right to expect in interacting with officers of the state.
B. Courtroom Cases
Numerous judicial opinions address the legal conse-
quences of the use of the F-word, or its symbolic equivalent,
in open court or in out-of-court communications to a judge or
95. Id.
96. Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1991).
97. Id. at 633.
98. Id. at 636, 639.
99. Id. at 634.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 634-35.
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court official.0 2 These cases typically concern the mainte-
nance of good order and dignity of the court and trial pro-
ceedings. In this category of cases, the most salient legal is-
sue is whether the F-word deployer should be held in
contempt of court, or otherwise legally sanctioned.
The California opinion of People v. Colbert... illustrates a
relatively clear-cut case justifying the imposition of judicial
punishment in the face of F-word use. Colbert involved an ex-
treme emotional and physical disruption of ongoing judicial
proceedings in open court. George Kenneth Colbert, a pro se
criminal defendant in a burglary trial, repeatedly used the
F-word in conjunction with other insulting language, specifi-
cally directing his outbursts at the trial court judge. For ex-
ample, Colbert told the judge, "[F]uck you and your contempt
of court, man" and said, "[Fluck that, man" during the trial
proceedings.' In addition, Colbert used the word "shit" in a
number of outbursts in open court.0 5 The court found it ap-
parent that Colbert's entire course of conduct was an attempt
to insult and humiliate the trial judge. Therefore, the appel-
late court readily affirmed the trial court's gag order, re-
straining order, and subsequent removal of the defendant
from the courtroom while the trial proceeded without him.0 6
Justice Hanson's concurring opinion in Colbert provided addi-
tional facts regarding the defendant's conduct which amplify
the disruptive nature of the defendant's courtroom conduct.' 7
For example, Colbert "constantly referred to the [trial] court
[judge] as a 'racist motherfucker,' among other expletives."' 8
Colbert also intentionally turned over the counsel's table. 9
With regard to a finding of contempt of court, "courts
have uniformly [sic] held that use of profane language in
court [like the F-word] is, by itself, grounds for contempt.""0
Thus, courts have, by way of illustration, found contempt or-
ders proper when an individual uses profanities or obscenities
102. See infra notes 103-36 and accompanying text.
103. People v. Colbert, 192 Cal. Rptr. 836 (Cal. App. 1983) (ordered unpub-
lished by CAL. CT. R. 976).
104. See id. at 838 n.3.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 842.
107. See id. at 843 (Hanson, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 852.
109. See Colbert, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 852 (Hanson, J., concurring).
110. In re L.G., 639 A.2d 603, 606, n.5 (D.C. 1994).
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at a judge.1 ' Moreover, courts have reasoned that even when
obscenities, profanities, or threats were not directed at the
trial judge, herself, the sanction of contempt of court is avail-
able and may be imposed by the trial court." ' Yet courts have
found that each use of the F-word during trial does not consti-
tute a separate contempt citation. Instead, the number of
contempt citations depends on the record. For example, in
State v. Bullock,"' the trial judge found the defendant guilty
by of seven counts of contempt of court for screaming "Fuck
you" to the trial judge on seven separate occasions during
trial."' As a result, the court sentenced the defendant to
seven consecutive six-month jail sentences. "5 The Louisiana
Superior Court affirmed the first three contempt citations,
but vacated the last four, emphasizing that "the power to jail
for contempt is given to the [trial court] judge on the assump-
tion that it will be judiciously and sparingly employed."" 6
Therefore, trial court judges must be circumspect in imposing
contempt. The court found that the use of the F-word as a re-
sponse to a judge's question was excusable because such "a
response to a question by this judge [would] seem[] to invite
and encourage further verbal sparring.""' Therefore, the
court found that the last four "fuck you" statements by the de-
fendant were not contemptuous because the defendant used
them "in response to a colloquy initiated by the trial judge.""8
Another reason for urging judicial restraint in imposing
111. See id. (citing Jackson v. Bailey, 605 A.2d 1350, 1352-53 (Conn. 1992);
Martinez v. State, 339 So. 2d 1133, 1134-35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), aft'd, 346
So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1977); State v. Allen, 496 A.2d 168, 171-72 (Vt. 1985)).
112. See id. (citing People v. Barrett, 342 N.E.2d 775, 777 (Il. App. Ct.1976));
Woody v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Allen, 572 P.2d 241, 244 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977)
(affirming criminal contempt judgment for making obscene gestures and threats
to witnesses, holding that it was not necessary that contemptuous behavior be
directed at the trial court itself since the actions were "committed in the pres-
ence of ... one of the constituent parts of the court while engaged in the busi-
ness devolved upon it by law"). See also Thomas v. State, 635 A.2d 71, 72 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (affirming citation for direct criminal contempt of court for
criminal defendant's in-court statements to trial court judge, including "Fuck
that judge, man" and "[F]ucker").
113. State v. Bullock, 576 So. 2d 453 (La. 1991).
114. See id. at 457.
115. See id. at 454.
116. Id. at 458 (quoting In re Masinter, 355 So. 2d 1288 (La. 1978)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 458.
1999]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
contempt citations for use of the F-word in the courtroom is
the concern that the speaker may be mentally ill. This con-
cern about mental capacity as a precondition for a contempt
citation was articulated by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Flynt."9 The
Court's summary of Larry Flynt's use of the F-word before the
trial court is stunning. For example, Flynt made the follow-
ing F-word statements in court: "What the fuck is going on
here?"; "You dumb, ignorant motherfucker" (addressed to the
magistrate judge); and "No fucking way you're going to get
away with it" (addressed to the judge).'2 ° Flynt also pro-
claimed, in response to a question,
I went to the United States Supreme Court and called
every one of them no good, lousy, dumb, mother-fuckers,
119. United States v. Flynt, 756 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985). Larry Flynt has
become an American cultural icon, largely due to the 1996 Oliver Stone-
produced film, THE PEOPLE VS. LARRY FLYNT (Columbia 1996), starring Woody
Harrelson and Courtney Love. A review of the film states:
A warm, fuzzy movie for armchair liberals. The People vs. Larry
Flynt whitewashes the life of the infamous pornographer for the benefit
of viewers who are all for the First Amendment-so long as it doesn't
protect anything too unpleasant.
In 1972, Larry Flynt (Woody Harrelson), is running a string of Cin-
cinnati strip clubs when he hits on the idea of publishing a newsletter
featuring nude photographs of his strippers. The idea is a big success,
largely because the pictures are substantially more explicit than those
found in mainstream men's magazines like Playboy. Expanded to
magazine format, Hustler becomes a huge hit. Aided by his wife and
business partner (Courtney Love), a former stripper, Flynt becomes a
wealthy man by testing the limits of obscenity and good taste. But as
the national mood of the late 1970s grows more conservative, the re-
lentlessly provocative Flynt becomes the object of numerous obscenity
lawsuits.
You'd be hard-pressed to find another biopic that whitewashes its
subject so thoroughly as [this film]. Director Milos Forman [nominated
for an Academy Award for Best Director for this film] would like you to
believe that Flynt's vulgar catalogue of racism, sexism, and anything
else that might be construed as offensive is simply a more honest varia-
tion on Playboy. Of course, we expect controversial subjects to be wa-
tered down in mass-market films, but in a film whose purpose is to sa-
lute our Constitutional right to free speech, the contents of Hustler
properly are an issue: the filmmakers' argument is seriously compro-
mised by their failure to trust their audience with the knowledge of
what kind of material that right protects. [The film] is generally an in-
telligent and entertaining film. Harrelson's good-ol'-boy raunchiness is
amusing, and singer Courtney Love gives an astonishingly good per-
formance in her first substantial film role.
THE MOVIE GUIDE 517(Cinebooks 1998).
120. Flynt, 756 F.2d at 1355 n.1.
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what assholes they were. And that I would be back as
soon as I was allowed out of prison to tell them mother-
fuckers they had violated my goddamn, mother-fucking
civil rights as long as they intend to, and if I am not kept
in prison. 12
Flynt's F-word statements also included, "Every mother-
fucking one of them. Blow those mother-fucking judges";
1 22
"Fuck you. Give me life without parole, you foul mother-
fucker" (response to the court);'23 and "Give me more, mother-
fucker. Is that all you can give me, you chicken-shit cock-
sucker. Lay eighteen months on me, you dumb mother-
fucker.... Fuck you in your ass."'24 The Ninth Circuit found
that there was a substantial issue as to Larry Flynt's mental
capacity to commit contempt, thereby suggesting that he
should have been given a hearing to present evidence on the
issue of his mental capacity.22 The Court concluded that the
"summary contempt power" of courts is "an extraordinary ex-
ercise to be undertaken only after careful consideration and
with good [cause]." 26
Conversely, the same standard was not applied to the
F-word-spouting criminal defendant in United States v.
Pina.27 In Pina, the appellate court took a stern view of the
defendant's trial behavior:
In the trial below, appellant's behavior was so outrageous
as to make the defendants [in other cases discussed in the
opinion] look well-mannered by comparison. Appellant
called the judge, among other things, a "little child," a
"fucking idiot," a "sick individual," a "fucking fool," a "ly-
ing bigot, motherfucker," a "cold-blooded fucking Wizard,"
a "[n]o-good piece of shit," and a "no-good maggot." He
told the judge he "should have been a Klansman," to put
his "mother in contempt ... that damn pig that brang you
in this world," "to hurry up and have a fucking heart at-
121. Id. at 1357 n.4.
122. Id.
123. Id. at n.5.
124. Id. at n.6.
125. See id. at 1358.
126. Flynt, 756 F.2d at 1363. "Only 'the least possible power adequate to the
end proposed' should be used in contempt cases." Id. (quoting Anderson v.
Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. United States v. Pina, 844 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988) (involving a defendant
charged with federal weapons violations).
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tack," to "suck my balls," and to "go fuck your mother. " 128
The court held that sentences for contempt occurring
during the course of the trial that did not exceed six months
per citation did not entitle a defendant to a jury trial. On the
other hand, sentences for contempt in excess of six months
per citation did entitle a defendant to a jury trial. 129 In Pina,
the appellate court discussed various approaches that a trial
court judge under attack by a criminal defendant could em-
ploy, including periodic summary contempt hearings at vari-
ous intervals during the trial and removal of the defendant
from the courtroom.3 ° Pina illustrates a case where a court,
while not sympathetic with the underlying conduct of a
F-word-deploying defendant, insists upon jury consideration
of the conduct when serious penalties are at stake.
Before leaving the category of courtroom F-word cases,
one further example, illustrating legal consequences of
F-word deployment in a courtroom-related context, may be
helpful. In United States v. Bellrichard,3' the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the federal
conviction of an individual who sent threatening communica-
tions through the mail,32 rejecting the defendant's First
Amendment freedom of speech argument. The defendant had
sent a postcard to the county attorney who prosecuted some
juveniles as adults. The postcard suggested, in part, that the
attorney should "leave town, go to prison eventually for
fucking up, or probably get killed by somebody you prose-
cuted."'33 The postcard went on to assert: "Smoke grass and
mellow out, you red-necked old whore! Fuck the law, and you
too!"" 4 This case is significant because of the Eighth Circuit's
stern view of extra-legal F-word insults of a judge, which
smacked at outright threats of violence.
128. Id. at 13-14.
129. Id. at 11 (citing Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974)).
130. See id. at 14. See also People v. Colbert, 192 Cal. Rptr. 836 (Ct. App.
1983) (ordered unpublished by CAL. CT. R. 976); see supra notes 103-06 and ac-
companying text.
131. United States v. Bellrichard, 994 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1993).
132. See id. The defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 876 (1993).
133. See id. at 1320-21 n.4.
134. Id. The defendant also sent a postcard to a local government official in-
dicating, "[Y]ou'd better get the rest of those stupid fucking commissioners to




Courts have also considered F-word uses in cases in-
volving harassment claims. 3 ' In this category of cases, courts
differentiate between actionable complaints of legal injury
and complaints that rely on overbroad legal rules and inhibit
freedom of expression.
The 1995 Florida case of Gilbreadth v. State"' illustrates
the difficulty that courts have in reconciling the tension be-
tween genuine harassment involving the F-word and circum-
stances where use of the F-word, while concededly disgusting
and inappropriate, involves important concerns of protected
speech. The majority opinion in Gilbreadth reasoned that a
Florida statute criminalizing the making of obscene or har-
assing telephone calls was constitutional-as limited by the
decision. As noted by the majority:
We narrow [the Florida] statute's construction and excise
the indefinite and vague terms "offend" and "annoy." We
do this in accord with the court's discretion to limit a stat-
ute to what is constitutional when the statute as so lim-
ited is complete in itself and consistent with the stated or
obvious legislative intent.... We conclude that the intent
of the statute is to prohibit intentional abusive, threaten-
ing, and harassing conduct by use of the telephone in the
manner specified [by the legislature] against a person
where that person has an expectation of privacy. "Offend"
and "annoy" [as written in the statute] are indefinite as to
meaning and give rise to subjective vague connotations. 137
The Gilbreadth majority, therefore, affirmed the convic-
tion of an individual who repeatedly used the F-word during
the course of a telephone conversation. However, Florida Su-
preme Court Justice Anstead dissented and argued that
criminal prosecution would unreasonably chill legitimate
forms of expression. For example, the dissent raised the pos-
sibility that a Florida citizen "reading the [statutory] provi-
sion might reasonably believe it criminalizes telling an 'off-
color joke' to a willing listener or forbids a sexually oriented
conversation (phone sex) between lovers."'38 Furthermore,
135. See infra notes 136-55 and accompanying text.
136. Gilbreadth v. State, 650 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1995).
137. Id. at 13.
138. Id. at 14 (Ansted, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Query: would Wil-
liam Jefferson Clinton have theoretically faced another impeachment count for
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under the majority's interpretation of the Florida criminal
statute, "friends discussing politics in a friendly conversation
may often violate the statute when they reach a point of dis-
agreement and one uses a 'dirty' word to 'annoy' or 'offend' the
other."'39
Free speech concerns were outweighed by real abuse and
harassment in In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.4 ' Ionosphere in-
volved a labor dispute between Eastern Airlines and a strik-
ing employees' union where the picketers surrounded the pro-
spective passengers and yelled "these planes will not fly, it is
going to fall, going to crash, your daughter is going to ...
die." '' The picketers also "call[ed] [a passenger] 'a fucking
stupid ass"' and called Eastern employees and persons doing
business with Eastern "scumbag," "cocksucker," "mother-
fucker," "fucking whores," "nigger," "faggot," "punk," "sissy,"
and "filthy bitch."' The court found that the conduct of the
picketers warranted the imposition of a limited injunction
against the union and precluded the union picketers at air-
ports from engaging in egregious instances of "verbal abuse,
intimidation and harassment."'
Conversely, in Hershfield v. Commonwealth,' the court
readily determined that no real harassment or threat of
abuse existed. At trial, Hershfield was convicted of violating
Virginia's breach of the peace statute4 ' for telling a woman,
from a distance, to "go fuck yourself."'46 The Virginia inter-
violating a criminal statute had he phoned Monica Lewinsky from a Florida ho-
tel room? See OFFICE OF THE INDEP. COUNSEL, REFERRAL FROM INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL KENNETH W. STARR IN CONFORMITY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF
TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 595(C), H.R. DOC. NO. 105-310, at 19-
20 (1998) ("On 10 to 15 occasions, [Lewinsky] and the President had phone
sex.").
139. Gilbreath, 650 So. 2d at 14 (Ansted, J., dissenting).
140. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 108 B.R. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
141. Id. at 912 (omission in original).
142. Id. at 920-21.
143. Id.
144. Hershfield v. Commonwealth, 417 S.E.2d 876 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
145. The statute reads:
If any person shall, in the presence or hearing of another, curse or
abuse such other person, or use any violent abusive language to such
person concerning himself or any of his relations, or otherwise use such
language, under circumstances reasonably calculated to provoke a
breach of the peace, he shall be guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor.




mediate appellate court reversed, reasoning in part that since
the parties were separated by at least fifty-five feet and a
chain link fence when the comments were made, telling an
individual to "go fuck yourself' was not the type of face-to-
face meeting likely to provoke breach of the peace.147 In his
concurring opinion, Judge Benton stated that Hershfield's ut-
terance, "go fuck yourself," did not reach the level of constitu-
tionally unprotected "fighting words"-differing from the
majority's implicit view that the spoken F-word was not pro-
tected speech. According to Benton's scholarly concurring
opinion,
[w]hen Hershfield said to his neighbor, "Go fuck yourself,"
he conveyed a message of disrespect to her. However, the
statute may not be interpreted to prohibit a person's ex-
pressions merely because the words offend or anger the
addressee. Nor may the state use the statute as a device
to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammati-
cally palatable to the most squeamish among us. Indeed,
almost [twenty] years ago Justice Powell observed that
"[I]anguage likely to offend the sensibility of some listen-
ers is now fairly commonplace in many social gatherings
as well as in public performances."
The words used by Hershfield were vulgar, insulting and
offensive, but they were not punishable under the statute
unless they are "fighting words." Hershfield's words of-
fensively suggested to his neighbor a sexual activity; how-
ever, they did not suggest a challenge or an intimation of
threatening contact.
14 1
Judge Benton also elaborated on the Constitutional dif-
ference between merely vulgar, but protected, words and un-
protected words that were "inherently likely to cause vio-
147. See id. at 878.
148. Id. at 880 (quoting Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 700 (1974)
(Powell, J. Concurring)) (citations omitted) (certain internal quotation marks
omitted). In Rozier v. State, 231 S.E.2d 131 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976), the court held
as a matter of law that a vulgar sexual proposition made to a female in her
presence did not constitute 'fighting words."' Other courts have held that use of
the words "fuck you," even when addressed to another, are not punishable as
fighting words in the absence of compelling reasons. See Diehl v. State, 451
A.2d 115 (Md. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098 (1983). See also City of Bis-
marck v. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1991); Downs v. State, 366 A.2d 41,
41-46 (1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977); Ware v. City and County of Den-
ver, 511 P.2d 475 (Colo. 1973).
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lence."'49 He wrote:
If one assumes, as the majority implicitly does, that the
words fall within the proscribed category, I find no evi-
dence that the circumstances reasonably tended to cause a
breach of the peace. There is no evidence that Walker's
reaction [as the recipient of the F-word] was uncharacter-
istic of a reasonable person in a like situation. Although
Walker heard the comment, the parties were separated by
some twenty yards and a fence when Hershfield spoke.
There is no evidence that Hershfield's tone was one of
violence or severe agitation. Neither party had ap-
proached or spoken to the other prior to Hershfield's ut-
terance of this phrase. The record does not show that
Walker manifested a disposition to retaliate violently
upon hearing Hershfield's comment. " °
Judge Benton also stressed the important linguistic, psy-
chological, and cultural point that verbal insults-like the
F-word-are emotional, not cognitive; variable, not literal.
With wit and sophisticated analysis, Benton observed:
"A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanging, it is
a skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color
and content according to the circumstances and the time
in which it is used." Unseemly words... may cause dis-
comfort and anger but do not rise to the level of fighting
words. "Words are often chosen as much for their emotive
as their cognitive force."151
Courts have also considered whether the use of the
F-word constitutes sexual harassment. Kloke v. Buckley In-
dustries, Inc.5' involved claims brought against a company
and various individuals for alleged Title VII sexual harass-
149. Hershfield, 417 S.E.2d at 880.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 880-81 (citations omitted).
Curses, oaths, expletives, imprecations, maledictions, and the whole
vocabulary of insults are not intended or susceptible of literal interpre-
tation. They are expressions of annoyance and hostility-nothing
more. To attach greater significance to them is stupid, ignorant, or
naive. Their significance is emotional, and it is not merely immeasur-
able but also variable. The emotional quality of exclamations varies
from time to time, from region to region, and as between social, cul-
tural, and ethnic groups.
Id. at 880-81 (quoting City of St. Paul v. Morris, 104 N.W.2d 902, 910 (Minn.
1960)).
152. Kloke v. Buckley Indus., Inc., No. 95-1298-JTM, 95-1392-JTM, 1996 WL
363032 (D. Kan. June 28, 1996).
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ment, wage discrimination based on race and gender, and re-
taliation. The F-word references in Kloke arose in relation to
the issue of whether or not this language was sufficient evi-
dence of sexual harassment. Granting summary judgment on
the plaintiffs' Title VII claims against individual defendants,
the district court held that vulgar language-both written
and verbal-when made as a "blatant sexual statement to an
employee or referring to an employee in a sexual manner"
could constitute sexual harassment.153 The Kloke opinion is of
particular interest, from the standpoint of American F-word
jurisprudence, because of a memorandum, written by Buckley
Industries "management" to all employees. The memoran-
dum stated, in pertinent part:
It has been brought to management's attention that some
individual's have been using offensive language in the
course of normal conversation between co-workers. Due to
complaints from some of the more easily offended co-
workers, this conduct will no longer be tolerated.
Management, does, however, realize the importance of
each person being able to properly express their feelings
when communicating with their fellow co-workers. Be-
cause of this, management has recruited a team of indi-
viduals to compile a list of code phrases, so that the free




You've got to be shitting me.
Tell someone who gives a fuck.
Ask me if I give a fuck.
It's not my fucking problem.
What the fuck?
Fuck it, it won't work.
Why the fuck didn't you tell me
sooner?
When the fuck do you expect me
to do this?
Who the fuck cares?
He's got his head up his ass.
New Phrases
I'm not certain that's feasible.
Really?
Perhaps you should check
with...
Of course I'm concerned.
I wasn't involved in that project.
Interesting behavior.
I'm not sure I can implement
this.
I'll try to schedule that.
Perhaps I can work late.
Are you sure it's a problem?
He's not familiar with the
153. Id. at *7.
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Eat shit.
Eat shit and die.
Eat shit and die, motherfucker.
What the fuck do they want
from my life?
Kiss my ass.
Fuck it, I'm on salary.
Shove it up your ass.
This job sucks.





I really don't give a shit.
Fuck you.
Get the fuck out of my office.
Oh, fuck, what [do] you want
now, dipshit?
I don't give a fuck.
Asshole.






They weren't happy with it.
So you'd like my help with it.
I'm a bit overdedicated at the
moment.
I don't think you understand.
I love a challenge.




Yes, we should discuss this.
I don't think it will be a prob-
lem.
How nice, how very, very nice.
Have a nice day.
What can I do for you, pal?
I can't be concerned by that at
this time.
Buddy.
Good idea, we should implement
this immediately.
1 54
Harassment/abuse cases involving use of the F-word il-
lustrate the importance of understanding the specific context
of each case and the relative degree of abuse suffered by each
plaintiff.
D. Attorney Disciplinary Cases
A fascinating category of cases involves professional
sanctions against attorneys for in- or out-of-court uses of the
F-word. These cases illustrate how courts generally disap-
prove of attorneys' use of the F-word and are not restricted by
the First Amendment from ordering serious professional
sanctions for such deviance-at least when F-word uses im-
pede the orderly administration of judicial proceedings.
154. Id. at *14-15.
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In re Vincenti'55 illustrates the willingness of courts to
sanction attorneys for making repeated discourteous, insult-
ing, and degrading F-word verbal attacks on the judge and
his or her rulings that substantially interfere with the orderly
process of trial. Attorney Vincenti repeatedly used the
F-word and other vulgarities in front of other lawyers and
witnesses in the courtroom. According to the New Jersey Su-
preme Court, Vincenti's aberrant conduct warranted a one-
year suspension from the practice of law or until further order
of the court."'
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Alison'57 involved a
more ambiguous set of facts than did Vincenti. Attorney
Alison made his F-word references outside of judicial pro-
ceedings, during the course of his bitter and emotionally dev-
astating divorce.' Yet, because of the cumulative weight of
these incidents, coupled with other erratic behavior, the
Maryland court suspended Alison from the practice of law for
ninety days. 9 According to the court, Alison's professional
misconduct "had its roots in marital discord."6 ° During a two-
year period, Alison (1) was arrested for drunk driving and
called the arresting trooper a "motherfucker;" (2) effected a
"citizen's arrest" of his ex-wife for allegedly taking his prop-
erty, by using a hammer to open the car door of his ex-wife
and taking the keys out of the ignition; (3) filed a forgery
complaint against his ex-wife; (4) harassed his ex-wife by
placing trash on her property; (5) resisted a court-ordered
search and used the phrase "fuck you" to his ex-wife's attor-
ney; and (6) verbally abused the court clerk, insisting that the
clerk "take the fucking papers," among other incidents.' The
court rejected Alison's argument that F-word language was
constitutionally protected speech. Instead, the court held
that use of epithets or personal abuse was not communication
of information or opinion. Further, even out-of-court F-word
usage involving court personnel had the potential of
"damag[ing]... the court system and.., the reputation of
155. In re Vincenti, 458 A.2d 1268 (N.J. 1983).
156. See id. at 1275. Among the attorney's F-word deployment was a remark
he made to a female attorney: "Go fuck yourself." Id.
157. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Alison, 565 A.2d 660 (Md. 1989).
158. See id.
159. See id. at 668.
160. Id. at 661.
161. See id. at 661-64.
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the legal profession."6 '
E. Written Word Cases
Most F-word jurisprudence involves spoken or predomi-
nantly spoken language. However, some cases involve situa-
tions where the F-word is written-in or on books, clothing,
newspapers, or other objects.
Two United States Supreme Court cases aptly illustrate
this classification for purposes of this article. First, in the
classic 1971 case, Cohen v. California,' the Court reviewed
the conviction of Cohen for disturbing the peace by entering a
county courthouse wearing a jacket inscribed with the words
"Fuck the Draft.""" The Supreme Court, in an opinion writ-
ten by Justice Harlan, reversed the conviction. As elegantly
explained by Professor Lackland H. Bloom, Jr. in his article
Fighting Back: Offensive and Cultural Conflict:6
Cohen v. California is probably the Court's most impor-
tant precedent protecting offensive speech. There, in a
very influential opinion by Justice Harlan, the Court held
that the First Amendment prohibited the state from pun-
ishing a person under a statute which prohibited "mali-
ciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any
neighborhood or person" by "offensive conduct" for wearing
a jacket that said "Fuck the Draft" in the corridor of a
courthouse. Justice Harlan's opinion is noteworthy in part
for the care he took in defining the issue as he explained
why the doctrines of conduct versus speech, time place and
manner regulation, obscenity, fighting words, hostile
audience reaction and captive audience were not control-
ling.... The Court again emphasized that the state is not
162. Id. at 667. Interestingly, however, the Alison court, citing an out-of-
jurisdiction precedent, observed that, "[a]ttorneys are not prohibited from using
profane or vulgar language at all times and under all circumstances." Id. (citing
In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d 394, 397 (Minn. 1987)).
163. Cf Bennet v. State, 273 A.2d 461 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971) (reversing
defendant's conviction for violating Maryland's obscenity law by possession of
an "underground" newspaper containing the F-word); Dillon v. Waller, 1995 WL
765224 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (involving libel, invasion of privacy and intentional
infliction of emotional distress allegations arising from a neighbor's dispute
triggered by the painting of "fuck you" on a church bus adjacent to the plaintiffs
property).
164. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
165. Id. at 16.
166. Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Fighting Back: Offensive Speech and Cultural
Conflict, 46 SMU L. REV. 145 (1992).
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free to assume, absent clear proof, that members of the
public are likely to violently attack a person who utters of-
fensive words, and that where practicable the state is un-
der a duty to protect the speech against hostile reaction.
Then, in the most crucial part of its opinion, it made four
significant points regarding the nature of offensive speech
and attempts to regulate it. First, it observed that the
"verbal cacophony" which may occur when offensive
speech is permitted is a sign of strength rather than
weakness. Second, it emphasized that it may be impossi-
ble for the state to determine which words are sufficiently
offensive to be prohibited, noting that "one man's vulgarity
[may be] another man's lyric." Third, the Court observed
that language, especially offensive language, is often cho-
sen for its emotive rather than its cognitive force. Finally,
the Court recognized that words and ideas may often be
inseparable and that the suppression of the former may
result in the suppression of the latter as well. As long as
Cohen is taken seriously and read honestly, significant
regulation of offensive speech should remain the exception
rather than the rule.
167
The second United States Supreme Court case regarding
the written F-word is Board of Education, Island Trees Union
Free School District v. Pico.' In Pico, the local school board
removed from the school library several allegedly vulgar
books that used the F-word. In a five-to-four decision, the
Court declared the school board's action in removing the
books unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. The
Court held "that local school boards may not remove books
from school library shelves simply because they dislike the
ideas contained in those books and seek by their removal to
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, re-
ligion or other matters of opinion.""9 Justice Powell, however,
voicing his vigorous dissent, noted:
In different contexts and in different times, the destruc-
tion of written materials has been the symbol of despotism
and intolerance. But the removal of nine vulgar or racist
books from a high school library by a concerned local
school board does not raise this specter. For me, today's
167. Id. at 150-51 (footnotes omitted).
168. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
169. Id. at 872 (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1999]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
decision symbolizes a debilitating encroachment on the in-
stitutions of a free people. 7 '
Interestingly, from the standpoint of F-word jurispru-
dence, Powell attached an appendix to his dissenting opinion
providing a summary of excerpts from the relevant books as
follows:
1) SOUL ON ICE by Eldridge Cleaver[:] . . .There are
white men who will pay to fuck their wives ....
2) A HERO AIN'T NOTHING BUT A SANDWICH by Al-
ice Childress[:]... Fuck the society.., yeah, and fuck you
too! ... I'm too old for them fuckin bunnies anyway.
3) THE FIXER by Bernard Malamud[:] ... fucking their
mothers .... Fuck yourself... go fuck yourself....
4) GO ASK ALICE by Anonymous[:] ... Then he said that
all I needed was a good fuck....
5) SLAUGHTERHOUSE FIVE by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.[:]
... you dumb motherfucker... never fucked anybody ...
go fuck yourself ... fucking sorry ... I'll never fuck a Po-
lack anymore .... 71
Written F-word cases are important because of their fo-
cus on ideas and communication that must be protected for
society to gain from tolerating diverse viewpoints.
F. Wiretap "Criminal Culture" Cases
In an extraordinary group of F-word cases, the annals of
American jurisprudence reveal the tawdry and unseemly
communication style of an assortment of organized crime fig-
ures caught by law enforcement wiretaps in what they
thought were private conversations. These cases constitute a
cornucopia of creative, shocking, and arguably humorous
F-word language games. For example, in United States v.
Marino,7' the following phrases are contained in the court's
summary of the facts, involving a wiretapped conversation:
"Fuck that little guinea";7' "A fucking success"; 4 "What the
fuck?"; '7 "I don't picture him getting fucking sliced and diced
170. Pico, 457 U.S. at 894, 897 (Powell, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 851-54 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
172. United States v. Marino, 835 F. Supp. 1501 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
173. Id. at 1510.




in the kitchen";76 "Keep this fucking thing going";77 "Where
the fuck is this money coming from?"; "8 " What do I look like, a
fuckin' nitwit?";'79 "Rocky called me that fucking night";8 °
"Give him a fucking massage, no blow jobs or nothing";'
"There's just so many other fucking things going on";'82 "Like
Louis can't fuck with you"; 83 "Looks like a fucking tank";8 4 "I
said I don't give a fuck if he's Jesus Christ. You don't fuck
and come here and give your money. I says and you're fuck-
ing lying because you told George to say two was for free,
there was no interest. I mean Pete and you told him not to let
me know about it. So I says to tell that fucking cousin of
yours to call me";' 8' "You bulldog motherfucker. I ever catch
you in fuckin' Lake County again I'll knock your mother-
fuckin' head off';'86 "Solly says shit, you fucking squat, 'cause
if I turn him loose, he will knock your fucking head off'; 8 "He
wanted to put a fucking turban on your head"; 8  "Louis don't
give a fuck";89 and "That was that fat fucker." 9°
By way of another extraordinary example, in United
States v. Nietupski,"'8 the wiretap recording of the defendant
yielded the following F-word language: "Say fuck me";
92
"Yeah, they'll cut your fuckin' throat"; 13 "I don't know,
fuck";" "I cut that fuckin' shit";"' "I wanna go fuckin' nuts";8 6
"For the rest of your fuckin' life"; 7 "You're fucked"; 8' "Fuck
176. Id. at 1512.
177. Id. at 1513.
178. Marino, 835 F. Supp. at 1513.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1518.
181. Id. at 1522.
182. Id. at 1530.
183. Id. at 1531.





189. Id. at 1532.
190. Marino, 835 F. Supp. at 1533.
191. United States v. Nietupski, 731 F. Supp. 881 (C.D. Ill. 1990).
192. Id. at 887.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 895.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 898.
197. Nietupski, 731 F. Supp. at 898.
198. Id.
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me out of $17,000";19 and "I want $1,800 a fuckin' ounce cash,
the day I bring it.""°° The wire tap "criminal culture" cases
cannot easily be generalized. The chief significance of these
cases is that they provide a window into the deviant use of
the F-word by various criminal subcultures.
G. Miscellaneous Cases
Certain F-word cases defy easy categorization. For in-
stance, the Supreme Court's opinion in Federal Communica-
tions Commission v. Pacifica Foundation2°0 -involving come-
dian George Carlin's F-word monologue recording, discussed
at the outset of this Article,"°' is a miscellaneous type of
F-word case involving federal telecommunications law. An-
other F-word case that can be put into this miscellaneous
category is U.S. v. Dellinger,°3 "the Chicago Seven" criminal
proceeding involving the "radical" protesters at the Chicago
National Democratic Convention in 1968 who were prose-
cuted for alleged violations of the federal Anti-Riot Act.2"' In
Dellinger, the court of appeals reversed the convictions below
on various grounds, but upheld the federal statute as not be-
ing unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. In the process of
reviewing the trial record, the appellate court referenced
various portions of the trial record involving testimony util-
izing the F-word. These references included the following:
"Purpose to fuck up the convention";2 0 "We are going to wreck
this fucking society because if we don't, it's going to wreck it-
self';20 6 "Look at these mother-fucking pigs. .. standing over
here.., they have to be standing in the park protecting the
park, and the park belongs to the people. Let's get these
fuckers out of here."2 7
199. Id. at 902.
200. Id. See also United States v. Maltese, 1993 WL 222350 (N.D. Ill. June
22, 1993) (extensive F-word language used from wiretap recording); United
States v. Marsh, 26 F.3d 1496 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Green,
1992 WL 211404 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (same).
201. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978).
202. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
203. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972).
204. 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (1970).
205. Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 399.




IV. A SYNTHESIS AND CRITIQUE OF F-WORD JURISPRUDENCE
A. Cop Cases and Courtroom Cases
In both "cop cases""0 8 and "courtroom cases,"0 9 the appel-
late courts generally express concern about the disruption of
society's law enforcement and law administration functions
and therefore generally disapprove of the use of the F-word.
However, in both categories, the opinions contain a presuppo-
sition of the appropriateness of official restraint by the police
or by trial court judges in seeking to punish F-word verbaliz-
ers. The key rationale for presupposing official punitive re-
straint is constitutional is that only "fighting words" that
have the potential to immediately incite a breach of the peace
are unprotected by the First Amendment shield. ' ° However,
the cop cases and courtroom cases also contain, either explic-
itly or implicitly, pragmatic reasons for the official punitive
restraint against those who speak the F-word. These prag-
matic reasons include: (a) a recognition that those using the
F-word may be under great emotional stress; (b) the fact that
police officers and trial court judges-as the targets of the use
of the F-word-should be able to manage the occasional re-
ceipt of an epithet without too much of a problem; and (c) the
fact that for flagrant, repeated, deeply personal, or menacing
F-word statements, police officers and trial judges may im-
pose proportionate, appropriate legal sanctions.
B. Harassment/Abuse Cases and Attorney Disciplinary Cases
In contradistinction to the cop cases and courtroom
cases,"' the "harassment/abuse""' and "attorney discipli-
nary" cases generally exhibit slight judicial tolerance for
F-word parlance. This difference in judicial attitude regard-
ing harassment/abuse cases seems premised on concern for
the disruption of private lives by stinging, offensive F-word
language that intrudes on a person's telephone line, disquiets
an airline passenger in the course of commencing a journey,
discriminates against a woman employee in the workplace in
208. See supra Part III.A.
209. See supra Part III.B.
210. See generally supra note 77 and accompanying text.
211. See supra Part III.A-B.
212. See supra Part III.C.
213. See supra Part III.D.
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a blatantly sexual manner based on the language utilized, or
otherwise shocks a person who cannot be presumed to know
how to "handle" the F-word encounter. The basis for the
comparatively harsh judicial perspective in attorney discipli-
nary cases involving attorneys' use of the F-word appears to
be high expectations that attorneys, as officers of the court
and as paragons of the legal system, will properly comport
themselves in court-related proceedings (whether in or out of
the courtroom). Thus, the attorney disciplinary cases are
akin in their underlying rationale to the cop cases and court-
room cases; but because attorneys are the users of F-word
language and defendants of the pertinent legal proceedings-
as opposed to the paradigmatic cop cases or courtroom cases,
where police and trial court judges are the recipients of the
F-word language and the initiators of the pertinent legal pro-
ceedings-the appellate judicial attitude toward attorneys dif-
fers from the appellate judicial attitude toward police officers
and trial court judges. Interestingly, in non-paradigmatic cop
cases and courtroom cases (for example, where police officers
are the users of F-word language and citizens the recipients),
the appellate judicial attitude toward the "official" F-word de-
fendant (i.e., the police officer) resembles the harsh judicial
attitude toward the attorney in the paradigmatic attorney
disciplinary cases.
C. Written Word Cases
In "written word" cases-where books, clothing, or news-
papers employ the F-word to express beliefs or complex hu-
man emotions-the courts generally protect the defendants
from liability.214 This appellate judicial forbearance in im-
posing legal penalties on a written F-word user, while not
monolithic in its approach, is rooted in an implicit assumption
that written language (particularly language in books and pe-
riodicals) tends to express ideas-as compared to merely
venting emotions. Therefore, these written ideas, even if
highly unorthodox, should be protected by our scheme of con-
stitutional liberty of expression. Another implicit judicial as-
sumption in the written word cases seems to be that written
F-word usage-as opposed to spoken F-word deployment-is
generally less jarring and intrusive of both public and private




D. Wiretap "Criminal Culture" F-Word Cases
The "wiretap 'criminal culture' F-word cases are largely
subjective indulgences by appellate courts in observing ex-
treme deviance in action.215 This category of F-word cases re-
veals that courts feel tempted to offer up snippets of secretly
recorded underworld conversations as an exercise in cultural
anthropology. Alternatively, an implicit assumption of courts
in F-word wiretap "criminal culture" cases is that such re-
peated, unrelenting, creative use of the F-word is evidence of
evil motives, which when accompanied by extortion, conspir-
acy, or threatening behavior, justifies the criminal sanctions
meted out. No mention is made in this category of cases of
freedom of expression, unorthodox ideas, or everyday emo-
tional acting-out.
V. MORAL THEORY
From a moral standpoint, the cases discussed in this arti-
cle reveal that judges exhibit situational ethics by condemn-
ing or justifying use of the F-word in particular circum-
stances. On a foundational level, no jurist really likes the use
of an F-word. Conversely, use of an F-word is almost univer-
sally viewed as being unfortunate, messy, repellent, or con-
troversial. But on a more rarefied level of analysis, jurists
make judgments about the context of the F-word usage. Un-
less the F-word recipient is someone who has special training,
or an official legal role, most courts tend to view use of the
F-word as a "bad" thing-that is, prima facially, subject to le-
gal sanction. This presupposition of badness can be overcome
if the F-word arguably expresses an idea, either stylistically
(e.g., a written novel about life in the ghetto) or substantively
(e.g., a political opinion about the draft or the Vietnam War).
In such a case, from the standpoint of moral theory, what was
"bad" is "good," or at least a "necessary bad." However, if the
user of an F-word is someone with special legal duties or
status-such as an attorney or an employer-the aforemen-
tioned moral presumption of badness is virtually irrebuttable.
While it is difficult to figure out why this virtually irrebutta-
ble moral presumption of badness exists, I speculate that it
215. See supra Part III.F.
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has something to do with the usage of power-laden, sexually
charged, language16 (because all F-word usage has at least an
implicit sexual meaning) by someone (like an attorney or an
employer) who already has the power of status. Too much
power, it seems, is always bad since too much power is op-
pressive.217
Morally and jurisprudentially speaking, what American
appellate courts do in F-word cases-which as we have seen,
typically concern open-ended legal standards involving such
ambiguous concepts as "contempt of court," "breach of the
peace," "harassment," "abuse," "disorderly conduct," "public
indecency," "conduct unbecoming an attorney," or "extor-
tion" 1 5-is to practice what legal philosopher Wilfred Walu-
chow calls "inclusive legal positivism."219 This "allows courts
to use moral argument to determine legal conclusions when
directed by the legal system to do so.""O
216. See generally, Sallie Tisdale, Talk Dirty to Me, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
SEX, 271, 278-80 (Alan Soble ed., 1997) (discussing sex and sexual images as
being all about "power").
217. Id. at 278.
Feminists against pornography.. . hold that our entire culture is por-
nographic. In a pornographic world all our sexual constructions are ob-
scene; sexual materials are necessarily oppressive, limited by the con-
straints of the culture. Even the act of viewing becomes a male act-an
act of subordinating the person viewed. Under this construct [Tisdale]
[is] a damaged woman, a heretic, [since she enjoys pornography].
Id. Compare other social contexts' use of sexually explicit language: JOHN
HEIDENRY, WHAT WILD ECSTASY: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SEXUAL
REVOLUTION 84, 224, 301 (1997) (sexual titillation, literary avant-gardism, and
libidinal satisfaction); JACK BOULUARE, SEX AMERICAN STYLE: AN ILLUSTRATED
ROMP THROUGH THE GOLDEN AGE OF HETEROSEXUALITY 78-89 (1997) ("bedside
smut").
218. See supra Parts III.A-D.
219. W.J. WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM (1994).
220. Roger A. Shiner, Law and Morality, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY, 448 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). As Shiner points
out, Waluchow's theory of "inclusive legal positivism" falls midway between
.strong versions of legal positivism" and weaker versions of legal positivism:
Strong versions of legal positivism deny any room for moral argument
in legal reasoning except where the court has, and exercises, discretion.
A court has discretion when it is not bound by any strictly institutional
or intra-legal standards. Anti-positivism by contrast urges that it is
part of the obligation of a court to reason from the moral point of view
whenever the good of justice overall would be served by doing so. There
seems room between these extremes for a weaker version of positivism,
which asserts that sometimes a court may have an obligation to use
moral argument to reach a legal conclusion, and sometimes it may
not.... Wilfred Waluchow... defends what he calls "inclusive legal
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This judicial "license to moralize," while rooted in broadly
textured legal standards, is also partly attributable to the
ambiguous, emotion-laden, and multiple meanings of the
F-word. 1 Thus, philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's quip
about the philosophy of language is particularly apt in the
case of F-word jurisprudence: "The results of philosophy are
the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and
of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head
up against the limits of language." 2 . Indeed, a critical limit
of F-word language, or as linguists would say, the F-word lex-
eme,"' is that it is a "loaded lexicon." 4 This is because the
F-word is "highly charged with connotations""-as distinct
from "denotations""--giving rise to essentially negative, idio-
positivism." Using legal systems with constitutions as a model, his "in-
clusive legal positivism" allows courts to use moral argument to deter-
mine legal conclusions when directed by the legal system to do so. The
resulting theory claims to be a richer positivistic theory than the
stronger form, which forbids legal status to be determined by moral ar-
gument only through the legitimate exercise of discretion.
Id. at 447-48.
221. See supra Parts I and II.
222. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 119 (1953)
(quoted in Martin Davies, Philosophy of Language, in THE BLACKWELL
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 90 (Nicholas Bunnin & E.P. Tsui-James eds.,
1996)).
223. "Lexicon" and "lexeme" are related linguistic terms of art.
The term lexicon is known in English from the early [seventeenth] cen-
tury, when it referred to a book containing a selection of a language's
words and meanings, arranged in alphabetical order. The term itself
comes from Greek lexis 'word'. It is still used today in this word-book
meaning, but it has also taken on a more abstract sense, especially
with linguistics, referring to the total stock of meaningful units in a
language-not only the words and idioms, but also the parts of words
which express meaning, such as the prefixes and suffixes.
DAVID CRYSTAL, THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
118 (1995). By way of comparison:
A lexeme is a unit of lexical meaning, which exists regardless of any in-
flectional endings it may have or the number of words it may contain.
Thus, fibrillate, rain, cats, and dogs, and come in are all lexemes, as are
elephant, jog, cholesterol, happiness, put up with, face the music, and
hundreds of thousands of other meaningful items in English.
Id.
224. Id. at 170 (explaining the concept of "loaded lexicon").
225. Id.
226. According to David Crystal:
A denotation is the objective relationship between a lexeme and the re-
ality to which it refers: so, the denotation of spectacles is the object
which balances on our nose in front of the eyes; and the denotation of
purple is a colour with certain definable physical characteristics. A de-
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syncratic, personal associations brought to mind by the re-
cipient of an F-word statement. In other words, F-word lan-
guage is a type of what semantician and former United States
Senator S.I. Hayakawa referred to as "snarl words" of the
English language. '27 On a more nuanced level, the F-word is a
type of "taboo" lexeme: "[i]tems which people avoid using in
polite society, either because they believe them to be harmful
or feel that they are embarrassing or offensive."2 8 Moreover,
notation identifies the central aspect of the lexical meaning, which eve-
ryone would agree about-hence, the concept of a "dictionary defini-
tion."
Id. By way of contrast:
[Connotation] refers to the personal aspect of lexical meaning-often,
the emotional associations which a lexeme incidentally brings to mind.
So, for many people, bus has such connotations such as "cheapness"
and "convenience;" for others, "discomfort" and "inconvenience;" for
many children, it connotes "school" and for many American adults in
this connection, it has a political overtone (because of the 1960's policy
in the U.S.A. of "bussing" children to school as a means of promoting
social integration in ethnically divided urban communities). Connota-
tions vary according to the experience of individuals, and ... are to
some degree unpredictable. On the other hand, because people do have
some common experiences, many lexemes in the language have conno-
tations which would be shared by large groups of speakers. Among the
widely-recognized connotations, of city for example, are "bustle,"
"crowds," "dust," "excitement," "fun," and "sin" ....
Id.
227. Id. at 171. As described by David Crystal, Hayakawa
distinguished between "snarl" words and "purr" words when discussing
connotations. To take his examples: the sentence You filthy scum is lit-
tle more than a verbal snarl, whereas You're the sweetest girl in all the
world is the linguistic equivalent of a feline purr or canine tail wag.
There is little objective content (denotation)in either sentence.
Id.
228. Id. at 172. Interestingly, there have developed in the English language
a variety of ways to avoid taboo words. According to David Crystal:
One is to replace [the taboo word] by a more technical term, as com-
monly happens in medicine (e.g., anus, genitalia, vagina, penis). An-
other, common in older writing, is to part-spell the item (f k bl-). The
everyday method is to employ an expression which refers to the taboo
topic in a vague or indirect way-a euphemism. English has thousands
of euphemistic expressions, of which these are a tiny sample:
Casket (coffin), fall asleep (die), push up the daisies (be dead), the
ultimate sacrifice (to be killed), under the weather (ill), after a long
illness (cancer), not all there (mentally subnormal), little girl's
room (toilet) .... be economical with the truth (lie), adult video
(pornography), let you go (sack), industrial action (strike), in the
family way (pregnant), expectorate (spit), tired and emotional
(drunk).
Id. Crystal also notes, in analysis that is apt for the F-word, that "[a]ll swear
words generate euphemisms, sooner or later, and the stronger the taboo, the
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the F-word is also clearly a "swear" word229 and-as previ-
ously discussed"°-a form of "slang."23'
larger the number of avoidance forms. The number of euphemistic expressions
based on God is quite impressive, but the strongest taboo word, cunt, has accu-
mulated around 700 forms." Id.
229. See CRYSTAL, supra note 223, at 173
230. See supra notes 3-11 and accompanying text.
231. "Slang is one of the chief markers of in-group identity. As such it comes
very close to jargon...." CRYSTAL, supra note 223, at 182. According to Brit-
ish lexicographer Eric Partridge (1894-1979), slang is employed by humans for
any of at least 15 reasons and, therefore, is complex. These reasons, quoted by
Crystal, are:
1. In sheer high spirits, by the young in heart as well as by the young
in years; "just for the fun of the thing;" in playfulness or waggishness.
2. As an exercise either in wit and ingenuity or in humour. (The motive
behind this is usually self-display or snobbishness, emulation or re-
sponsiveness, delight in virtuosity).
3. To be "different," to be novel.
4. To be picturesque (either positively or-as in the wish to avoid insi-
pidity-negatively).
5. To be unmistakably arresting, even startling.
6. To escape from clich6s or to be brief and concise. (Actuated by impa-
tience with existing terms).
7. To enrich the language....
8. To lend an air of solidity, concreteness, to the abstract; of earthiness
to the idealistic; of immediacy and appositeness, to the remote. (In the
cultured the effort is usually premeditated, while in the uncultured it is
almost always unconscious when it is not rather subconscious).
9. (a) To lessen the sting of, or on the other hand to give additional
point to, a refusal, a rejection, a recantation; (b) To reduce, perhaps
also to disperse, the solemnity, the pomposity, the excessive serious-
ness of a conversation (or a piece of writing); (c) To soften the tragedy,
to lighten or to "prettify" the inevitability of death or madness, or to
mask the ugliness or the pity of profound turpitude (e.g. treachery, in-
gratitude); and/or thus to enable the speaker . . . to endure, to "carry
on."
10. To speak or write down to an inferior to amuse a superior public; or
merely to be on a colloquial level with either one's audience or one's
subject matter.
11. For ease of social intercourse. (Not to be confused or merged with
the preceding).
12. To induce either friendliness or intimacy of a deep or a durable
kind....
13. To show that one belongs to a certain school, trade, or profession,
artistic or intellectual set, or social class; in brief, to be "in the swim" or
to establish contact.
14. Hence, to show or prove that someone is not in the swim.
15. To be secret-not understood around one. (Children, students, lov-
ers, members of political secret societies, and criminals in or out of
prison, innocent persons in prison are the chief exponents).
Id. (quoting ERIC PARTRIDGE, SLANG: TODAY AND YESTERDAY 6, 7 (1934)).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Judicial encounters with the F-word in the facts of vari-
ous types of cases have spurred an interesting assortment of
cases that discuss, either explicitly or implicitly, the morality
of F-word usage under the circumstances. This article is
merely an initial sketch of some ways of classifying F-word
cases and some thoughts on analyzing the fascinating nature
of F-word jurisprudence. In this sketch I have discussed the
fascinating multiplicity of meanings found in the complex
etymology and lexicology of the F-word. My principal contri-
bution, however, is a tentative categorization and classifica-
tion of various F-word cases. My synthesis and critique of
these cases leads to an interesting jurisprudential taxonomy
of American morals as seen through the eyes of judges.
